INTRODUCTION
"Strategic Communication (STRATCOM) -United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power." As a foreign occupying power the United States finds Afghanistan a rocky conceptual landscape for strategic communication. However difficult, when facing enemies such as the Taliban and al Qaeda who are highly adept at delivering their organizational messages, crafting an effective strategic communication plan is critical for ultimate success. 4 For the purposes of this monograph, the term strategic communication (STRATCOM) speaks to the combined national efforts of all government agencies to affect operations at home and abroad. 5 Within the larger umbrella of strategic communications are both public diplomacy and public affairs. The former speaks to the range of words and deeds meant to inform and persuade audiences abroad while the latter specifically addresses communications directed through various media to inform all audiences-at home and overseas.
presented. Finally, once the two strategic communication environments are established, an analysis of current STRATCOM operations will be presented along with recommendations for improvement.
Events in Afghanistan over the last eight and a half years indicate this much-long-term U.S. foreign policy toward Afghanistan is meant to be generally benign. The U.S. occupation has always been limited in scope and not designed to colonize the country or even use it as a long term base of operations along the lines of post war Germany, Japan, or Korea. The primary focus for U.S. intervention in Afghanistan is to locate and defeat terrorists who threaten U.S. national interests. Additionally, U.S. Afghanistan policy centers on eliminating actors detrimental to the Afghan populace such as the Taliban and al Qaeda while supporting human rights and self-rule.
Nevertheless, these policies are perceived wholly differently by people living in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the greater Islamic World. This perception is based on a number of factors, but one primary variable is how the U.S. Government (USG) communicates its intentions and methods in Afghanistan and the region. 
U.S. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION-A BRIEF HISTORY
Understanding and improving methods for strategic communication is a key to ultimate success in Afghanistan.
In a world of highly complex information systems, the United States Government currently utilizes a variety of processes and organizations to explain, promote, and promulgate its policies and values to foreign audiences. While overarching responsibility for strategic communication to foreign audiences currently belongs to two governmental offices-The Under
Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy and the Broadcasting Board of
Governors-studying the history of USG strategic communications is also worthwhile.
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The USG has communicated to wide audiences since its birth from newspapers and pamphleteers up to and following the American Revolution to FDR's radio fireside chats of the early 20 th century and beyond. 9 In terms of a formal approach to streamlining and homogenizing messages for foreign audiences, two world wars and a subsequent Cold War led directly to the creation of a series of governmental organizations dedicated to government communications.
During World War I, President Woodrow Wilson established the Committee on Public
Information (CPI) to inform audiences abroad.
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Many early attempts, led by U.S. Congressman Emmanuel Celler failed owing to political concerns by the American people of escalation toward war.
During the rise of Nazi Germany in the midlate 1930s, the Roosevelt administration built information mechanisms to counter Nazi propaganda being broadcast into Europe and Latin America. The PCC recognized that: "all communication and public diplomacy activities should:
Underscore our commitment to freedom, human rights and the dignity and equality of every human being; Reach out to those who share our ideals; Support those who struggle for freedom and democracy; and Counter those who espouse ideologies of hate and oppression."
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The PCC ultimately concluded that:
The PCC also laid a foundation for making U.S. communications an interagency activity. Further, the PCC laid out three actionable priorities for public diplomacy-expand education and exchange programs, modernize communications, and to promote the "diplomacy of deeds". "Public diplomacy is, at its core, about making America's diplomacy public and communicating America's views, values and policies in effective ways to audiences across the world. Public diplomacy promotes linkages between the American people and the rest of the world by reminding diverse populations of our common interests and values. Some of America's most effective public diplomacy is communicated not through words but through our deeds, as we invest in people through education, health care and the opportunity for greater economic and political participation. Public diplomacy also seeks to isolate and marginalize extremists and their ideology. In all these ways, public diplomacy is "waging peace," working to bring about 38 Ibid, 9. conditions that lead to a better life for people across the world and make it more difficult for extremism to take root."
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The goals of this PCC are important for future success in U.S. foreign policy. The report acknowledges the continuing struggles in coordinating strategic communication across multiple federal agencies. The PCC also makes the broader observation that communicating U.S.
intentions abroad is tantamount to ultimate success in foreign policy and national security.
Finally the PCCs findings are especially important in the current primary U.S. foreign policy landscape-Afghanistan
U.S. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION AND AGHANISTAN

Understanding strategic communications efforts between the United States and
Afghanistan is imperative to the long-term success of any mission there. How the intentions and subsequent actions of the United States is interpreted and understood lays the foundation for the direction Afghanistan will take and whether or not the Afghan people will flourish or fail. In order to fully grasp the complexity involved in the U.S.-Afghan communications relationship, it is important to look at what drives and motivates each side. Recognizing the lenses and filters through which each society understands and interprets information is a key factor in making strategic communications work. Deconstructing the complexity of intercultural communications involves the analysis of a whole host of these lenses and filters. Three lenses that we will consider are the history of U.S./ Afghanistan relations to date, identity within each culture, and the symbols that each culture uses to understand and interpret information. The most notable instance is the Taliban's relationship with al Qaeda. Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the international community was left with little choice than to target al Qaeda training camps and leadership cells and subsequently the Taliban when formulating a response. 42 The purpose of the United States government efforts was clear and understood. The U.S. wished to purge Afghanistan of any/all al-Qaeda elements and to further deny the organization's members operating space or safe haven.
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"This military action is a part of our campaign against terrorism, another front in a war that has already been joined through diplomacy, intelligence, the freezing of financial assets and Despite the fact that, by statute, the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs acts as the primary coordinator for all U.S. strategic communications efforts, in the 12 years since its inception the post remained empty for over a third of that time frame.
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In terms of managing public diplomacy the near constant turbulence within the Office of the Under Secretary has shown a lack of confidence in the system as currently structured. Across three different presidential administrations, Clinton, Bush, and Obama, the position has been held consistently by a member of the advertising community or it has remained empty. Given the differences in leadership philosophy compared to the homogeneity of approach toward public diplomacy along with the constant unsatisfactory performance it is difficult not to question the management of the system as it stands.
This vacancy calls into question a host of managerial, policy, and strategic issues.
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There seems to be little or no legislative will toward improving or even changing the public diplomacy process currently in place. In the past four years, only two bills in either house of commerce directly addressed U.S. strategic communication structure. Of the two bills both were sponsored by members of the minority party and neither reached a floor vote. Nevertheless, taking on wholesale changes to a communication structure that is already riddled with misunderstanding and poor performance is a far less enticing policy target than healthcare, energy policy, or job creation. Additionally, without a coherent and maintainable strategy any changes in public diplomacy force structure could very possibly be for naught.
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During most of the Bush years following 9/11, U.S. public diplomacy centered on locating and highlighting common ground between the U.S. and the Arab-Islamic world. These efforts focused on basic human desires to perpetuate family life, secure peace, and find prosperity. In the words of President George W. Bush in late 2002-"There is a value system that cannot be compromised-God-given values. These aren't United States-created values. There are values of freedom and the human condition and mothers loving their children. That's very important as we articulate our foreign policy through diplomacy and military action." This simple, straightforward query by Ambassador Holbrooke indicates the frustration often surrounding U.S. public diplomacy strategy. This frustration aimed at how the United States with all of its power and, given its benign intentions, can consistently lose to a less sophisticated more sinister enemy is at the heart of the ongoing debate. Actions behind these efforts typically took the form of traditional advertising designed to convince the audience to buy a certain good or idea. In this case the idea suggested was that the United States was not a colonial hegemonic power but instead a responsible partner in the global community.
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One persistent strategy to accomplish this goal was to compare similarities in the Western and Islamic cultures. These messages were communicated through many different mediums.
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Time and again U.S. public diplomacy efforts sought to convince adversaries and neutrals that U.S. culture and intentions abroad were at their nature benign and not to be feared. Over and over the public diplomacy aimed at convincing opponents that Western culture was not that far removed Arab-Islamic culture and could be trusted because of those basic similarities. These assertions of like mindedness were often delivered via means of traditional U.S. pop culture vehicles and those vehicles too often appeared to be vastly different than their Arab-Islamic counterparts. Again and again these attempts seemed to fall on deaf ears when they reached their intended audience.
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Another approach to public diplomacy in the Greater Middle East centers not on a basis of comparison but instead of contrasting the two cultures in hopes of winning some sort of value judgment not over cultures per se but over the struggle itself between those promulgating violent jihad and the U.S. Supporters of this approach advocate for a more direct public diplomacy message that seeks to undercut the Jihadist message while promoting our own. To do this we must first clearly define both and understand the processes that make them happen. In order to fully appreciate the complexity and scope of creating effective message(s) for U.S. foreign policy in Afghanistan, it is necessary to understand the sources of foreign policy itself. One theory that proposes the genesis of U.S. foreign policy is agued succinctly by Steven Hook. 69 Hook describes the creation of U.S. foreign policy as two initial sets of inputs that pass through U.S. governing institutions and then result in actionable policies. The two initial inputs are material resources and ideas. These inputs originate from various institutions-Congress, The
White House, and agencies such as the Departments of State, Defense, and National Intelligence.
These institutions then shape the material and ideas into foreign policy. Foreign policy then is transmitted in a variety of ways-direct foreign aid, foreign military sales, traditional diplomacy and military action to name a few. 70 One aspect that acts as a continuous ribbon running through each foreign policy action is the message that the foreign policy is meant to deliver. (Fig. 1-1 old: 7 1/2 years in the Afghan jihad, one a half years in the jihad in Palestine, and the rest of the years have no value". 79 Ironically, the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan, while supported by the United States, actually gave root to current difficulties in U.S. foreign policy messaging today. This is due to the perception that once one of the two infidel superpowers had been defeated the other must then be dealt with and that secondary task would prove much easier. Osama bin Laden said of the task "(The Soviet Union is) the more determined, the more ruthless, the more dangerous of the two.
Dealing with a soft and pampered United States would, so it seemed, be a much easier task." 87 By Osama bin Laden's own estimation, "al Qaeda spent "$500,000 on the September 11 th attacks while America lost more than $500 billion…that makes a million
American dollars for every al Qaeda dollar."
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To better understand the effectiveness of these messages, it is worthwhile to dissect one missive and get to the heart of its power. The following message was issued by Osama bin Laden in November 2002:
This ability to overcome traditional advantages like unlimited resources has confounded U.S. efforts in strategic communication in the post 9-11 world and must be studied at a root ethnographic level to create an eventual solution.
"What [US President George] Bush, the pharaoh of this age, was doing in terms of killing our sons in Iraq, and what Israel, the United States' ally, was doing in terms of bombing houses that shelter old people, women and children with US-made aircraft in Palestine were sufficient to prompt the sane among your rulers to distance themselves from this criminal gang. Do your governments not know that the White House gangsters are the biggest butchers of this age? Our kinfolk in Palestine have been slain and severely tortured for nearly a century. If we defend our people in Palestine, the world becomes agitated and allies itself against Muslims, unjustly and falsely, under the pretence of fighting terrorism."
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Here we see multiple intentions. First bin Laden reminds the audience that the sender of the message shares a similar degree of faith and piety. Also, that piety it is not merely a way of thinking or living but also has insight beyond that of most believers-it is faith plus insight.
Lastly, the opposite message (that the U.S.) is not merely incorrect or impious-it is unholy and in The result of this difference in identity and symbols has left Afghanistan as the world's largest opium supplier producing 6100 metric tons which constitutes 92% of the global supply.
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These examples provide insight on a few of the key differences that fuel the failure of U.S. strategic communication in Afghanistan. Differences are evident in temporal understanding where U.S. political messages, designed for short term understanding, clash with an Afghan cultural memory that is more long term. Another clash is also found in identity where circumstance and history shape a markedly different worldview for Afghans than it does Americans. Finally, an inherent recognition on both sides that these differences exist, are stark, and must be considered with every communication is lacking. These shortcomings, while serious, can be ameliorated and must be to craft an adequate strategic communications policy for Afghanistan.
The opium trade concurrently communicates the idea to the American people that neither government is capable of achieving either a single internal rebuilding goal a primary national goal. Additionally, a communications "win" is collected by the Taliban and other insurgent elements who support the drug trade.
BUILDING A NEW STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS FRAMEWORK FOR AFGHANISTAN
Thus far we have seen that the task of communicating effectively within the Afghanistan theater is exceedingly difficult. Misunderstanding abounds, resources are expended at a high rate, and cultural differences block consistent efforts at progress. Further complicating the effort is the fact that the U.S. currently lacks a well-defined, resourced, truly strategic communications apparatus. This leads to frustration on both sides as Americans struggle with whether or not to 104 Ibid.
continue the effort in Afghanistan and Afghans struggle with making it through their daily lives safely in an attempt to build a functioning state.
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This analysis will provide a framework for building a strategic communications framework for the Afghanistan mission along with a menu of broad ideas aimed at streamlining
American strategic communications overall. The former will address the specific needs of one current operational theater while the latter provides a structure for future American communications needs, irrespective of situation.
In terms of building a communications strategy for Afghanistan, the effort must begin and end with transparency. Transparency is a term used throughout the U.S. government to denote a sense of fairness, ethics, and trust. Transparency is a stated goal of the current administration as a contrast to the previous administration.
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Strategic transparency in Afghanistan should permeate all U.S. public communications efforts in Afghanistan. Strategically, making our national goals in Afghanistan clear, attainable, and communicable at every level is the primary concern. Two examples of this are "creating a secure
Afghanistan to allow for the growth of the Afghan government and security forces" and "to root out and destroy al Qaeda forces operating in Afghanistan". These are examples of strategic messages that could be defined at the national level, developed at the operational level, and executed at the tactical level to the Afghan people. These messages speak to U. This solution would provide the most comprehensive and broad-reaching choice for strategic communications. It would make law a set of communications development and direction processes that cabinet secretaries would be compelled to comply with. A legislative solution would ideally provide much needed resources for the assessment and conduct of STRATCOM while concurrently creating a cabinet-level authority for directing strategic communications efforts across the government. With time and proper staffing, a legislative approach could be the best way to achieve long-term STRATCOM success, it is not without pitfalls. In addition to political obstacles, there is also the issue of Congress and its track record of legislating change within the executive branch. While examples like Goldwater-Nichols provide needed reform and improvement over the long-term, they also tend to cause significant friction in the near term due to Congress' lack of deep understanding of operations across government agencies. This friction will do little to help America in her current struggles, namely Afghanistan, and could do more to reverse recent gains there than to improve the situation. To strike a balance between a long-term statutory solution and a near-term operational solution, the government may look to crafting a solution from the executive branch.
It is certainly not difficult to imagine lawmakers' motivations in failing to coalesce around a broad STRATCOM framework in the face of high unemployment, a crisis in healthcare, and a lagging economy but it does little for the nation's future in communicating strategically.
An executive branch solution would utilize existing resources within the government to build a true national strategic communications apparatus. This option could take on a number of forms-a "STRACOM czar" appointed by the President but outside the purview of Senate While this designation is already part of U.S. law, the office has yet to achieve the desired effect. This is due to a consistent lack of resources, a lack of clear directive authority, and a perceived dearth of confidence in the political appointees selected to hold the position over the last 11 years. In order to remedy these nagging issues, the office must be fully funded and provided with more directive authority over existing STRATCOM structures across the government. Additionally, a fundamental discussion across the federal STRATCOM community should be undertaken in serious consequences for our national security. By studying history and culture then processing that information through a truly national communications strategy, America creates its best opportunity for success in Afghanistan and beyond.
As key voices in the nation's primary agencies for strategic communications, the Department of State, Department of Defense, and the White House, should they agree to empower the Under Secretary, that office could accomplish a considerable amount of good.
